Resale price maintenance and collusion
重新审视了转售价格维持（RPM）帮助上游企业合谋的传统观点，分析了在有和无RPM时，零售商观察到本地需求或成本冲击后合谋的可能性，发现RPM可能促进合谋并降低总福利。
The article revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs. In the absence of RPM, retail prices react to retailers' information, and deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect. By eliminating retail price flexibility, RPM facilitates the detection of deviations but reduces profits and thus increases the short‐run gains from a deviation. Overall, RPM can facilitate collusion and reduce total welfare when firms adopt it .