Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity
研究了父母利他主义差异导致遗产不平等时最优遗产税的设计，发现从征税到补贴的多种结果取决于社会福利函数的具体设定，并提出了一个有助于分类这些可能性的标准化方法。
We develop a theory of optimal estate taxation in a model where bequest inequality is driven by differences in parental altruism. We show that a wide range of results are possible, from positive taxes to subsidies. The results depend on redistributive objectives implicit in the cardinal specification of utility and social welfare functions. We propose a normalization that is helpful in classifying these different possibilities. We isolate cases where the optimal policy bans negative bequests and taxes positive bequests, features present in most advanced countries.