Learning and Complementarities in Speculative Attacks
研究投机者交易如何向央行传递信息并影响其政策，发现学习过程引发协调行为导致大规模货币攻击，央行可通过降低事后对市场信息的权重来改善事前政策效果。
We study a model where the aggregate trading of currency speculators reveals new information to the central bank and affects its policy decision. We show that the learning process gives rise to coordination motives among speculators leading to large currency attacks and introducing non-fundamental volatility into exchange rates and policy decisions. We show that the central bank can improve the <it>ex ante</it> effectiveness of its policy by committing to put a lower weight <it>ex post</it> on the information from the market, and that transparency may either increase or decrease the effectiveness of learning from the market, depending on how it is implemented.