Managing Earnings Surprises in Japan: Perspectives from Main Bank Relationships and Institutional Ownership
研究日本企业主银行关系和机构所有权如何影响管理层达到或超过分析师预期的动机，发现主银行关系降低该动机，而机构持股则增加该动机。
Abstract: In this study, we examine the impact of main bank relationships and institutional ownership on management's incentives to meet or beat analysts’ expectations in Japan. We hypothesize that close main bank relationships reduce managers’ incentives to meet or beat analysts’ expectations since investors place less weight on the need to achieve capital market‐based performance benchmarks. Consistent with our prediction, we find that firms with close main bank relationships are less likely to meet or beat analysts’ expectations. In contrast, we find that the incidence of meeting or beating analysts’ consensus forecasts is greater for firms with institutional shareholders, suggesting that such investors place greater importance on achieving capital market–based performance benchmarks. Overall, our findings support the notion that banks and institutional investors play a significant role in firms’ financial reporting behavior.