Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization
研究央行沟通策略如何确保私人预期与货币政策一致，发现详细沟通政策细节或条件变量能恢复泰勒原理的有效性，而仅沟通通胀目标则不足以防止预期驱动的波动。
The value of communication is analyzed in a model in which agents' expectations need not be consistent with central bank policy. Without communication, the Taylor principle is not sufficient for macroeconomic stability: divergent learning dynamics are possible. Three communication strategies are contemplated to ensure consistency between private forecasts and monetary policy strategy: communicating the precise details of policy; communicating only the variables on which policy decisions are conditioned; and communicating the inflation target. The former strategies restore the Taylor principle as a sufficient condition for anchoring expectations. The latter strategy, in general, fails to protect against expectations-driven fluctuations.