Crop Insurance under Catastrophic Risk
构建了一个新保险模型，揭示巨灾风险如何影响农作物保险市场均衡的性质与存在性，发现巨灾风险会提高保费、降低农民投保水平，甚至导致市场崩溃，而补贴再保险有助于促进均衡和参与。
Abstract We develop a new insurance model that shows how catastrophic risk affects the nature and existence of a crop insurance market equilibrium. A reservation preference level is used to characterize long‐run equilibrium when catastrophic risk makes insurance companies risk responsive. Catastrophic risk is shown to increase premiums, reduce farmer coverage levels and, under some conditions, lead to a complete breakdown of the crop insurance market. Reinsurance can help facilitate an equilibrium and/or increase participation, particularly if the reinsurance is subsidized. The analysis has important implications for the design and management of crop insurance and reinsurance programs.