Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model
研究了两组人之间冲突与不信任的循环，发现误解会引发冲突，但理性人最终会意识到冲突可能是错误开始的，从而尝试合作，重启循环。
We propose a model of cycles of conflict and distrust. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of bad types who always take bad actions. Good actions may be misperceived as bad and information about past actions is limited. Conflict spirals start as a result of misperceptions but also contain the seeds of their own dissolution: Bayesian agents eventually conclude that the spiral likely started by mistake, and is thus uninformative of the opposing group's type. The agents then experiment with a good action, restarting the cycle.