Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors
研究企业无法承诺未来支付但资产可被签约时，与外部投资者的金融契约和重新谈判问题。结果表明，包含短期和长期债权人的资本结构优于单一类型，因为它增强了企业家事后重新谈判的激励。
We study the problem of financial contracting and renegotiation between a firm and outside investors when the firm cannot commit to future payouts, but assets can be contracted upon. We show that a capital structure with multiple investors specializing in short-term and long-term claims is superior to a structure with only one type of claim, because this hardens the incentives for the entrepreneur to renegotiate the contract ex post. Depending on the parameters, the optimal capital structure also differentiates between state-independent and state-dependent longterm claims, which can be interpreted as long-term debt and equity