Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: a General Equilibrium Approach
构建一般均衡模型，分析契约执行中公共部门反腐与产权保护对投资和人才配置的影响，发现适度腐败和低产权保护可能最优，且存在同时减少腐败、增加投资并优化人才配置的“免费午餐”区间。
We consider an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments. Contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes. We find that: (1) It may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully. (2) Less developed economies may choose lower levels of property right enforcement and more corruption. (3) There may exist a 'free-lunch' such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to reduce corruption, increase investment, and achieve a better allocation of talent.