Tournaments in Mutual-Fund Families
研究美国股票型共同基金家族内部，基金经理如何根据在家族内的相对排名调整投资风险，且这种调整在高费率、单人管理的大型家族中更明显。
We examine intrafirm competition in the mutual-fund industry. We test the hypothesis that fund managers within mutual-fund families compete with each other in a tournament. Our empirical study of the US equity mutual-fund market shows that they adjust the risk they take depending on the relative position within their fund family. The direction of the adjustment depends on the competitive situation in that family. Risk adjustments are particularly pronounced among managers of funds with high expense ratios, which are managed by a single manager and which belong to large families. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.