The Effects of Retailer and Consumer Response on Optimal Manufacturer Advertising and Trade Promotion Strategies
通过动态优化模型，分析零售商和消费者反应如何影响制造商在广告和贸易促销之间的最优资源分配，发现零售商库存成本和促销疲劳会限制贸易促销支出，而广告与贸易促销在最优计划中具有替代关系。
This research examines how retailer and consumer responses influence a manufacturer's optimal advertising and trade promotion plans. We develop a dynamic optimization model which considers the actions of the manufacturer, retailers, and consumers. The manufacturer attempts to maximize its profits by advertising directly to consumers and offering periodic trade deal discounts to the retailer in the hope that the retailer will in turn “pass through” a retailer promotion to the consumer. We show how the manufacturer's optimal allocation depends on consumer response to advertising, consumer response to retailer promotions, retailer inventory carrying cost, and retailer passthrough behavior. For example, we find that retailer carrying costs and promotion wearout play a central role in constraining expenditures on trade promotions. We predict that as trade promotions are designed to eliminate forward buying, manufacturers will find it in their interest to promote more steeply. We also find a natural tendency for advertising and trade dealing to substitute for each other in an optimal plan.