Identification, Estimation, and Testing in Parametric Empirical Models of Auctions within the Independent Private Values Paradigm
研究了荷兰式、英式、第一价格密封投标和维克里四种拍卖机制在独立私人价值范式下的参数化结构计量模型的识别、估计与检验问题，对使用实验或实地数据的拍卖研究者有参考价值。
Recent advances in the application of game theory to the study of auctions have spawned a growing empirical literature involving both experimental and field data. In this paper, we focus on four different mechanisms (the Dutch, English, first-price sealed-bid, and Vickrey auctions) within one of the most commonly used theoretical models (the independent private values paradigm) to investigate issues of identification, estimation, and testing in parametric structural econometric models of auctions.