Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games
为同时共同代理博弈引入新的揭示机制，虽不能完全刻画均衡，但能刻画应用中通常关注的均衡结果，并展示其在菜单拍卖、非线性关税竞争和道德风险等场景中的用途。
We introduce new revelation mechanisms for simultaneous common agency games which, although they do not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, do facilitate the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes that are typically of interest in applications. We then show how these mechanisms can be used in applications such as menu auctions, competition in nonlinear tariffs, and moral hazard settings. Lastly, we show how one can enrich the revelation mechanisms, albeit at a cost of an increase in complexity, to characterize all possible equilibrium outcomes, including those sustained by non-Markov strategies and/or mixed-strategy profiles.