Optimal Strategic Pricing of Reproducible Consumer Products
研究消费者可通过购买或复制获取的耐用品（如软件）的战略定价，利用双扩散模型和控制理论推导垄断期最优价格路径，发现撇脂定价通常最优，且仅当销售扩散远快于复制且保护技术不显著提高边际成本时，复制保护才合理。
This paper investigates the strategic pricing of consumer durable products which can be acquired through either purchase or reproduction (e.g., computer software). As copy piracy results in an opportunity loss, its adverse effect on profits needs to be incorporated in strategic decisions such as pricing. Using a dual diffusion model which parsimoniously describes sales and copying, and employing control theory methodology, optimal price trajectories are derived for the period of monopoly. The results indicate that (a) in absence of any protection, skimming pricing strategies are generally optimal, and (b) copy protection is warranted only when sales diffuse much faster than copying and the protection technology does not significantly raise the marginal production cost.