Interim Rank, Risk Taking, and Performance in Dynamic Tournaments
利用专业人士在大型奖励锦标赛中的数据，研究发现中期排名与风险承担呈倒U型关系，且排名接近榜首时绩效反而下降，揭示排名信息会阻碍领先者表现。
We empirically study the impact of interim rank on risk taking and performance using data on professionals competing in tournaments for large rewards. As we observe both the intended action and the performance of each participant, we can measure risk taking and performance separately. We present two key findings. First, risk taking exhibits an inverted-U relationship with interim rank. Revealing information on relative performance induces individuals trailing just behind the interim leaders to take greater risks. Second, competitors systematically underperform when ranked closer to the top, despite higher incentives to perform well. Disclosing information on relative ranking hinders interim leaders.