非自愿失业与环境政策:双重红利假说

Involuntary Unemployment and Environmental Policy: The Double Dividend Hypothesis

Scandinavian Journal of Economics · 1997
被引 88
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究环境税改革能否在改善环境的同时减少非自愿失业,使用效率工资模型分析,发现特定条件下环境税改革可降低失业并提高福利。

Abstract

An environmental tax reform might bring about gains over and above improved environmental quality. In particular, if tax revenues from environmental taxes are used to reduce the tax on wage income, positive employment effects can result in second‐best economies. An efficiency wage model is used to analyze the impact of an ecological tax reform on involuntary unemployment. The government controls emissions by selling emission permits. Employment of labor and wages are determined endogenously. Conditions are identified under which an environmental tax reform reduces unemployment and increases welfare.

非自愿失业环境税改革双重红利假说效率工资模型