Point/Nonpoint Effluent Trading with Spatial Heterogeneity
研究流域内点源与非点源排污权交易的最优比率调整，考虑污染物空间异质性，基于芬兰Kymi河流域数据模拟发现农民是主要许可证供给者，但交易收益分配不均。
Abstract Potential earnings from permits sales may provide an incentive for farmers to accept water quality regulation. We derive optimal adjustments of point/nonpoint effluent trading ratios for heterogeneity in marginal environmental damage and degradation/retention of the pollutant across locations in a watershed. A simulation based on data from the Kymi River Valley, Finland, indicates that farmers are the greatest suppliers of permits, as expected, but that gains from trading vary substantially. Some farmers may become net buyers of permits and thus net losers from regulation. The benefits of effluent trading are distributed unevenly among point sources as well.