The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Acquisition Attempts and Target Shareholder Wealth
发现目标公司管理层持股比例低于同行或随机非目标公司，且在竞争性收购中更低；管理层持股在成功谈判中与异常回报正相关，但不会最终阻止收购。
This paper examines the relation between managerial ownership and the probability of being a target firm, and the impact of managerial ownership on target shareholder returns. The paper finds that targets have lower managerial ownership than either their industry counterparts or randomly selected nontargets. Managerial ownership is significantly lower in contested compared to uncontested offers, and in unsuccessful compared to successful cases. Managerial ownership is significantly related to abnormal returns in contested cases that are ultimately successful. The results are consistent with a positive impact of managerial ownership where it is used to negotiate, but not ultimately block, an acquisition.