Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets
研究声誉如何形成以及随时间演变，以缓解借贷双方利益冲突。借款人若缺乏声誉会倾向高风险项目，而声誉需时间才能改善激励，并识别了声誉发挥作用需时市场的普遍特征。
This paper studies reputation formation and the evolution over time of the incentive effects of reputation to mitigate conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders. Borrowers use the proceeds of their loans to fund projects. In the absence of reputation effects, borrowers have incentives to select excessively risky projects. If there is sufficient adverse selection, reputation will not initially provide improved incentives to borrowers with short credit histories. Over time, if a good reputation is acquired, reputation will provide improved incentives. General characteristics of markets in which reputation takes time to work are identified. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.