Social Preferences and Competition
质疑了竞争市场中社会偏好可被忽略的普遍观点，指出当偏好不可分离或合同不完备时（如金融市场和劳动力市场），社会偏好能解释许多市场异常现象。
There is a general presumption that social preferences can be ignored if markets are competitive. Market experiments (Smith 1962) and recent theoretical results ( Dufwenberg et al. Forthcoming ) suggest that competition forces people to behave as if they were purely self‐interested. We qualify this view. Social preferences tend to be irrelevant if two conditions are met: separability of preferences and completeness of contracts. These conditions are often plausible, but they fail to hold when uncertainty is important (financial markets) or when incomplete contracts are traded (labor markets). Social preferences can explain many of the anomalies frequently observed on these markets.