A Risk‐sharing Approach to Transfer Pricing and Incentive Compensation Problems under Exchange Rate Uncertainty*
研究了跨国公司在面临汇率风险时，由于经理人风险偏好不同，传统转移定价规则导致资源分配低效的问题，并提出了两种能实现高效资源分配和风险分担的转移定价与补偿方案。
ABSTRACT This study examines the transfer pricing and incentive compensation problems in a multinational enterprise facing currency risk. It is shown that, in the presence of diverse risk preferences among managers, the Hirshleifer (1956) transfer pricing rule results in inefficient resource allocation decisions by division managers. Following the approach developed by Kanodia (1979), two transfer pricing and compensation systems are proposed. The proposed systems enable central management to achieve efficient resource allocation and partial or global risk sharing. It is also argued that the proposed plans can be implemented in conjunction with existing transfer pricing systems that primarily serve tax and tariff concerns.