The Donor Problem: An Experimental Analysis of Beneficiary Empowerment
通过实验研究捐赠者依赖中间人向受益人传递福利时，中间人同时拥有选择权和交付权会导致扭曲：他们倾向于选择更富有的受益人以减少投诉，并利用受益人的感激心理来掩盖自身克扣行为。
Donors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. These recipients may, however, withhold complaints to 'thank' the intermediary for selecting them. Furthermore, the intermediary may distort selection (for example, by picking richer recipients who feel less entitled) to reduce complaints. We design an experimental game representing the donor's problem. We compare two institutions. In one treatment the intermediary selects recipients. In the other selection is random - as by an uninformed donor. In our data random selection dominates delegation of the selection task to the intermediary. Selection distortions are similar but intermediaries divert more when they have selection power (correctly anticipating that gratitude for selection will reduce complaints). Our results identify a problem in combining selection and delivery tasks. The insights are also applicable to social funds, decentralisation and participatory projects.