The Effect of Competition on Wages and Productivity: Evidence from the United Kingdom
利用英国1954-1973年制造业面板数据，通过比较卡特尔法实施前后卡特尔化与非卡特尔化行业，发现合谋显著降低劳动生产率增长，但对工资无显著影响。
I examine the impact of competition on wages and productivity using a panel data set of U.K. manufacturing industries over 1954-1973. The introduction of cartel law in the United Kingdom in the late 1950s caused an intensification of price competition in previously cartelized manufacturing industries, but it did not affect those industries that were not cartelized. The econometric results from a comparison of the two groups of industries before and after the introduction of cartel law provide strong evidence of a negative effect of collusion on labor productivity growth. There is no evidence of any effect of collusion on wages. These results are robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of collusion and are further strengthened by a comparison with U.S. data. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.