Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade
在一个两国寡头竞争贸易模型中，研究了市场结构和贸易成本如何影响并购政策的严格程度，并利用美国和加拿大行业数据校准模型，发现当前贸易成本下多数行业的并购政策过于严格。
Abstract In a two-country international trade model with oligopolistic competition, we study the conditions on market structure and trade costs under which a merger policy designed to benefit domestic consumers is too tough or too lenient from the viewpoint of the foreign country. We calibrate the model to match industry-level data in the U.S. and Canada. Our results suggest that at present levels of trade costs, merger policy is too tough in the vast majority of sectors. We also quantify the resulting externalities and study the impact of different regimes of coordinating merger policies at varying levels of trade costs.