The Matching Problem (and Inventories) in Private Negotiation
通过实验室实验，研究不同匹配风险场景和提前生产对市场结果的影响，发现买方集中时价格低于竞争水平约23%，接近预测的买方垄断价格，卖方可通过联盟提高议价能力。
Abstract This study examines laboratory market outcomes under alternative matching risk scenarios and advance production. Limited access and/or asymmetry in the number of buyers and sellers cause a matching problem. When sellers hold inventory before sale and there is buyer concentration, prices are about 23% below the competitive level and close to the predicted monopsony price. The bargaining advantage shifts to buyers in this market environment. Sellers can benefit by creating alliances or cooperatives to increase their bargaining position for price and overcome poor access to buyers.