Endogenous Communication Among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives
银行对客户的信息垄断会抑制借款人努力，银行可通过承诺共享信息来解决激励问题，但信息共享加剧竞争降低未来利润，需权衡当前与未来收益。
If banks have an informational monopoly about their clients, borrowers may curtail their effort level for fear of being exploited via high interest rates in the future. Banks can correct this incentive problem by committing to share private information with other lenders. The fiercer competition triggered by information sharing lowers future interest rates and future profits of banks. But, provided banks retain an initial informational advantage, their current profits are raised by the borrowers' higher effort. This trade-off determines the banks' willingness to share information. Their decision affects credit market competition, interest rates, volume of lending, and social welfare.