ON THE THEORY OF ETHNIC CONFLICT
提出一个族群冲突理论，认为按族群结成的联盟争夺经济资源，族群的作用是强制联盟成员身份；在族群同质的社会中，失败方成员可以低成本叛逃，从而排除冲突作为均衡结果。模型推导出冲突发生率、族群距离、群体规模、收入不平等和可掠夺资源等社会、政治、经济指标之间的关系。
We present a theory of ethnic conflict in which coalitions formed along ethnic lines compete for the economy's resources. The role of ethnicity is to enforce coalition membership: in ethnically homogeneous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to the winners at low cost, and this rules out conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance among ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources.