The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice
研究大股东能否通过基于私有信息出售股票来缓解股东与经理之间的利益冲突，发现退出机制有惩戒作用，但效果因代理问题类型、私有信息多寡而异，有时甚至加剧冲突。
We examine whether a large shareholder can alleviate the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers through his ability to sell his shares on the basis of private information. We show that large shareholder exit often has a disciplinary impact, but that (i) the effectiveness of this mechanism can be quite different depending on whether the agency problem involves a desirable or an undesirable action from shareholders ’ perspective; (ii) additional private information may increase or decrease the large shareholder’s effectiveness; and (iii) in some cases the presence of the large shareholder may exacerbate the agency problem.