有或没有优先购买权的拍卖与国家公园管理局特许经营合同

Auctions with and without the Right of First Refusal and National Park Service Concession Contracts

American Journal of Agricultural Economics · 2005
被引 13
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

建模分析了国家公园管理局特许经营合同拍卖中有无优先购买权的影响,发现取消优先购买权能促使投标人提供更高质量的服务。

Abstract

The National Park Service has struggled to improve the quality of service provided by concessioners for decades. To address these concerns, the Park Service eliminated the right of first refusal from the largest revenue‐generating concession contract auctions beginning in 2000. This article provides models of concession contract auctions with and without the right of first refusal. The optimal bidding strategies and expected level of service are found. The results confirm the auction without the right of first refusal leads to bids that include a higher level of service.

拍卖优先购买权国家公园服务特许经营合同