INTERTEMPORAL COURNOT AND WALRAS EQUILIBRIA: AN ILLUSTRATION*
在跨期一般均衡框架下比较古诺均衡与瓦尔拉斯均衡，发现古诺代理人交易和投资更少，且这种无效率不会随代理人数量增加而消失。
In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an inefficiency that does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., it moves towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., it moves away from the Walrasian amount). " S'il y avait 3, 4, ...n producteurs en concurrence [...] la valeur de p, qui en résulte, diminuerait indéfiniment par l'accroissement indéfini du nombre n ,”A. A. Cournot (1838, p. 63)."