Strategic Investment under Open Access: Theory and Evidence
研究了受接入监管的企业在必须与竞争对手共享基础设施时的投资激励，发现投资受市场规模和市场结构影响，并利用美国电力数据证实了战略投资行为。
We examine the incentives of access‐regulated firms to invest in infrastructure facilities they must share with competitors. We show that investment incentives can be decomposed into a non‐strategic and a strategic part. The non‐strategic part implies that investment depends positively on market size. The strategic incentives imply that investment also depends on market composition, namely, the market shares of the facility owner and its competitors. Using a dataset of regulated electric utilities in the U nited S tates, we find evidence that transmission investments are indeed made strategically. C eteris paribus , utilities are less likely to invest, and investment levels are lower, when competitors occupy a larger share of the market.