过失责任下的责任保险

Liability insurance under the negligence rule

RAND Journal of Economics · 2009
被引 23
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

将证据标准引入过失责任与责任保险的分析,发现当事故后证据可私下签约且噪音不大时,严格责任和过失责任都能实现效率;否则严格责任效率较低,过失责任更优,且可通过将赔偿与受害者实际损害脱钩来进一步改进。

Abstract

We incorporate the concept of evidentiary standard to the analysis of the negligence rule under liability insurance and court errors. When the postaccident evidence is privately contractible and not too noisy, efficiency is achieved by both strict liability and a negligence rule with appropriate due care and evidentiary standards. When the evidence is not directly contractible, trial outcomes represent useful contractible information for the risk‐incentives tradeoff in the liability insurance policy. Strict liability is then inefficient and dominated by the negligence rule. The negligence rule can itself be improved upon by decoupling damages from the harm suffered by the victim.

过失责任责任保险证据标准法院错误