Is Environmental Dumping Greater when Plants are Footloose?
研究全球化是否导致政府制定更弱的环境政策，尤其在工厂流动性强的行业，通过比较两种博弈结构发现，市场分享博弈中的环境倾销可能比区位博弈更严重。
We address concerns that globalisation gives national governments incentives to set weak environmental policies and that these incentives are particularly strong in industries where plants are footloose. Using a simple model of imperfect competition, we compare the environmental policies that would be set by non‐cooperative governments for two different move structures—where governments set environmental policies after firms decide where to locate (market share game) and where governments set environmental policies before firms decide where to locate (location game). We show that the extent of environmental dumping in the market share game can be greater than in the location game. JEL classification F 1; H 4; L 5; Q 2