Perceptions of Benevolence and the Design of Agency Contracts: CEO-TMT Relationships in Family Firms
研究CEO对高管团队仁慈的感知如何影响合同保护条款，基于西班牙122家家族企业数据验证假设，对理解家族企业治理和代理合同设计有参考价值。
In this study, we view the contracts of top managers from an integrated agency theory-trust perspective, arguing that two conditions reflecting CEO risk bearing, top management team (TMT) behavioral uncertainty and CEO vulnerability, are negatively related to a CEO's perceptions of TMT benevolence toward him-/herself, which in turn influence the protective features of TMT contracts. Model tests on data from 122 family-owned firms in Spain support our hypotheses overall. Agency theory may be enhanced by accounting for a CEO's perceptions (as principal) of TMT benevolence and for the effect of those perceptions on contracts with TMT members (as agents).