Moral Hazard, Targeting and Contract Duration in Agri‐Environmental Policy
扩展了多期农业环境合同模型，引入更现实的跨期违规惩罚，发现农民倾向于在合同早期违规，并据此提出监管资源应跨期优化配置以促进全程合规。
Abstract This article extends the multi‐period agri‐environmental contract model of Fraser (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 55 , (2004) pp. 525–540) to include a more realistic specification of the inter‐temporal penalties for non‐compliance, and therefore of the inter‐temporal moral hazard problem in agri‐environmental policy design. It is shown that a farmer has an unambiguous preference for cheating early over cheating late in the contract period based on differences in the expected cost of compliance. It is then shown how the principal can make use of this unambiguous preference to target monitoring resources intertemporally, and in so doing, to encourage full contract duration compliance.