Overconfidence by Bayesian-Rational Agents
论文推导了贝叶斯理性个体因先验不同而倾向于过度自信的两种机制，解释了他们为何高估自身估计的精确度，对理解经济决策中的认知偏差有参考价值。
This paper derives two mechanisms through which Bayesian-rational individuals with differing priors will tend to be relatively overconfident about their estimates and predictions, in the sense of overestimating the precision of these estimates. The intuition behind one mechanism is slightly ironic: In trying to update optimally, Bayesian agents overweight information of which they overestimate the precision and underweight in the opposite case. This causes overall an overestimation of the precision of the final estimate, which tends to increase as agents get more data. This paper was accepted by Teck Ho, decision analysis.