Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types
研究讨价还价问题，各方有外部选项且信息私有，允许外部选项分布相关。各方拥有否决权，且事后不能获得补贴。结果表明，只要私人信息分散，无论相关形式如何，无效率都不可避免。
We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to outside options, the size of the pie is commonly known and each party privately knows the realization of her outside option. We allow for correlations in the distributions of outside options. Parties have a veto right, which allows them to obtain at least their outside option payoff in any event. Besides, agents can receive no subsidy ex post. We show that inefficiencies are inevitable whatever the exact form of correlation, as long as private information is dispersed. We also illustrate how veto constraints differ from ex post participation constraints.