The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
研究具有实时议程设置和默认政策演变特征的立法机构，发现当存在孔多塞赢家时，足够多的提案机会可选出该赢家；在不存在孔多塞赢家的政策空间（如猪肉桶或纯再分配政治）中，最后提案者在较弱条件下近乎独裁。
We examine legislative policy making in institutions with two empirically relevant features: agenda setting occurs in real time and the default policy evolves. We demonstrate that these institutions select Condorcet winners when they exist, provided a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals. In policy spaces with either pork barrel or pure redistributional politics (where a Condorcet winner does not exist), the last proposer is effectively a dictator or near-dictator under relatively weak conditions. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.