Competitive Parity, Status Disparity, and Mutual Forbearance: Securities Analysts' Competition for Investor Attention
研究证券分析师在公平披露规则（Reg-FD）实施后如何因竞争对等、地位差异和多点接触而相互克制，高地位分析师克制更强，影响其行为及向投资者提供的信息。
Most studies of responses to change in competitive environments focus on competitor-specific adaptations. However, rivals are often acutely aware of one another, and this awareness should influence their competitive behavior. In this study, we focus on three market structures that affect competitive behavior: competitive parity, status disparity, and multipoint contact. In particular, we examine how securities analysts responded to a regulatory discontinuity, Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg-FD”), which promotes competitive parity by eliminating privileged access to proprietary firm information as a critical source of competitive advantage. We predict and find that Reg-FD activated mutual forbearance among analysts linked through multipoint contact. We also predict and find that high-status analysts forbear more strongly. Analysts' responses to heterogeneity in competitive advantage thus depend importantly on their competitive overlap and status, which has implications for both their behavior and the information they provide to investors.