Information and bargaining in the hold‐up problem
在经典敲竹杠问题中引入部分信息结构，发现最优信息结构需平衡事前效率与事后效率，且不对称信息是重要的福利工具，为信息流控制提供了制度设计基础。
This article incorporates an information structure with partial information into the canonical hold‐up problem. The optimal information structure balances the tradeoff between ex ante efficiency (the “information rent” effect) and ex post efficiency (the “bargaining disagreement” effect). With one‐shot bargaining, it occurs at an intermediate level of information asymmetry; when there is repeated bargaining, it is attained with perfect asymmetry. Asymmetric information, the parameter that is frequently ignored in the literature, turns out to be an important welfare instrument for the hold‐up problem. Our results therefore provide a basis for institutional design regarding the optimal control of information flow.