Centralization versus Decentralization: An Application to Price Setting by a Multi-market Firm
比较了企业在两个市场销售同一产品但只能定一个价时，集中定价与分散定价的优劣，发现分散定价更可能发生在市场需求曲线斜率差异大或本地经理预期价格分歧大的情况下。
This paper compares centralized and decentralized price setting by a firm that sells a single product in two markets, but is constrained to set one price (e.g., due to arbitrage). Each market is characterized by a different linear demand function, and demand conditions are privately observed by a local manager. This manager only cares about profits in his own market and, as a result, communicates his information strategically. Our main results link organizational design to market demand. First, if pricing is decentralized, it is always delegated to the manager who faces the flattest inverse demand function, regardless of the size of market demand. Second, even when pricing can be allocated to an unbiased headquarters, decentralization is optimal when markets differ sufficiently in how flat the inverse demand functions are. Finally, decentralization is more likely when, in expectations, local managers disagree more about prices.