Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims
通过谈判实验，研究当谈判者持有不可行诉求产生的权利感时，这种道德产权如何影响开价、谈判时长、让步和协议结果，独立于法律产权。
In many business transactions, labor-management relations, international conflicts, and welfare-state reforms, bargainers hold strong entitlements that are often generated by claims that are not feasible anymore. These entitlements seem to shape negotiation behavior considerably. By using the novel setup of a “bargaining with claims” experiment, we provide new systematic evidence tracking the influence of entitlements and obligations through the whole bargaining process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining duration, concessions, and (dis)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a “moral property right” that is influential independent of negotiators' legal property rights.