Cooperative Conflicts and Gender Relations: Experimental Evidence from Southeast Uganda
通过2005年在乌干达巴吉苏地区进行的实验游戏，研究夫妻如何管理家庭资金，质疑森模型中女性自我福利感知较低和现金贡献作为谈判权力基础的观点，主张更广泛地描述破裂位置。
This study analyzes research results from experimental games played in the predominantly Bagisu area of Uganda in 2005. The games were designed to understand how husbands and wives manage household funds in relation to Amartya Sen's model of cooperative conflicts, which is widely used as a heuristic device for understanding intrahousehold bargaining. This study questions Sen's emphasis on the lower self-perceptions of personal welfare among women and on the role of cash contributions to the household as the basis of bargaining power, and it argues for a broader characterization of breakdown positions.