Former CEO Directors: Lingering CEOs or Valuable Resources?
研究了前CEO留任董事对公司的影响，发现成功且有权的前CEO更可能被重新任命，且公司通常从中受益，表现为会计绩效更好、继任CEO的离职对业绩更敏感，以及在业绩极差时可重新聘用前CEO。
We investigate corporate governance experts' claim that it is detrimental to a firm to reappoint former CEOs as directors after they step down as CEOs. We find that more successful and more powerful former CEOs are more likely to be reappointed to the board multiple times after they step down as CEOs. Firms benefit, on average, from the presence of former CEOs on their boards. Firms with former CEO directors have better accounting performance, have higher relative turnover-performance sensitivity of the successor CEO, and can rehire their former CEO directors as CEOs after extremely poor firm performance under the successor CEOs.