An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization
通过实证分析30家完成重组的公司，揭示第11章重组程序复杂、耗时且成本高昂，并发现绝对优先权常被违反以利于股东，可能源于谈判或股东导向管理层保留企业价值的再签约过程。
ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to understand the institutional features of Chapter 11 from an empirical examination of thirty firms that have emerged from reorganization. We find the recontracting framework of Chapter 11 to be complex, lengthy, and costly. Violations of absolute priority in favor of stockholders are frequently encountered. These deviations may result from the bargaining process of Chapter 11 or from a recontracting process between creditors and stockholders which recognizes the ability of stockholder‐oriented management to preserve firm value. An example of such recontracting addresses Myers' underinvestment problem. An investigation of the effects of Chapter 11 on the pricing of risky debt is also provided.