TYING IN TWO‐SIDED MARKETS WITH MULTI‐HOMING*
研究了双边市场中当用户可多归属时捆绑销售对竞争和社会福利的影响，发现多归属下捆绑可能提升福利，对反垄断案例有启示。
This paper analyzes the effects of tying on market competition and social welfare in two‐sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi‐homing by participating in multiple platforms to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi‐home and makes platform‐specific exclusive content available to more consumers, which is beneficial to content providers. As a result, tying can be welfare‐enhancing if multi‐homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi‐homing. The analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi‐homing is prevalent.