The Economics of Collective Reputation: Evidence from the Wine Industry
利用意大利葡萄酒联盟（葡萄酒产区）的原始数据，研究集体声誉的经济学及其决定因素，发现集体声誉具有历史依赖性，最低质量标准和有效执行是关键驱动因素，且群体规模与集体声誉呈非线性关系。
Abstract We use original data regarding the array of Italian winery coalitions (wine denominations) to analyze the economics and determinants of collective reputation. We first run a cross‐sectional analysis with 2008 data and the full set of control variables, then move to the dynamics of collective reputation with panel data analysis on a 30‐year time span (1978–2008). Group reputation is history‐dependent. In particular, past bad collective behavior increases the probability of being stuck in a “bad reputation trap.” Minimum quality standards and effective enforcement are fundamental drivers of group reputation. The relationship between group size and collective reputation is non‐linear: free entry may not be optimal due to free‐riding problems. Finally, institutional signals such as the wine classification system are useful because they can be used by consumers as easily available proxies for information that is much more difficult to acquire.