The Shielding of CEO Compensation from the Effects of Strategic Expenditures*
研究薪酬委员会是否及为何屏蔽CEO薪酬免受研发、广告等战略支出导致的利润下降影响，发现屏蔽研发支出更显著，且能提高合同效率。
Abstract This study investigates whether and why compensation committees shield CEO compensation from income‐decreasing effects of strategic expenditures. We document that firms do shield recurring strategic expenditures such as research and development and advertising expenditures. We also find that firms shield research and development expenditures more than advertising expenditures. Our results are consistent with prior findings that suggest that compensation committees shield CEOs from nonroutine transactions such as restructuring charges and extraordinary losses. Using a two‐task principal‐agent framework, we show that such shielding improves the efficiency of the contract by making the shielded income measure more congruent with the principal's objectives.