Decentralisation and Accountability in Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries
用一个理论模型分析发展中国家将公共服务交付从中央官僚分权给地方民选政府的影响，比较了官僚垄断收费和地方精英俘获两种情形下的服务量、效率和公平。
Many developing countries are experimenting with decentralisation of public service delivery to elected local governments instead of bureaucrats appointed by a central government. We study the resulting implications in a theoretical model in which the central government is uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations. Bureaucrats charge bribes for services as monopoly providers, resulting in underprovision of services, especially for the poor. Local governments are directly responsive to their citizens needs but may be subject to capture by elites. Effects of decentralisation on service volumes, efficiency and equity are analysed under different financing arrangements for local governments. Copyright 2006 Royal Economic Society.