Information Sales and Insider Trading with Long‐Lived Information
比较了分析师销售信息与内幕交易两种信息流入股市的方式，发现分析师提供信息时市场更活跃、信息含量更高。
ABSTRACT Fundamental information resembles in many respects a durable good. Hence, the effects of its incorporation into stock prices depend on who is the agent controlling its flow. Like a durable goods monopolist, a monopolistic analyst selling information intertemporally competes against herself. This forces her to partially relinquish control over the information flow to traders. Conversely, an insider solves the intertemporal competition problem through vertical integration, thus exerting tighter control over the information flow. Comparing market patterns I show that a dynamic market where information is provided by an analyst is thicker and more informative than one where an insider trades.